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ZAKARIA RHANI
The Inmate’s Two Bodies: Survival and 
Metamorphosis in a Moroccan Secret Prison*
Tazmamart is not an ordinary prison. It is a system of secret detention that chal- 
lenges the Foucauldian model and its rationale is best understood outside a universal 
paradigm of modernity. All rational forms, all the proceedings, the choice of place 
of detention, the organization of the cells, and the policy of rationing are driven by 
the will to undo life. The prisoners either die or transmute to survive. This paper 
reports the experience of one of the survivors who, compared to his fellow inmates, 
narrates his bodily metamorphosis in confounding and unparalleled terms, with the 
purpose of grasping his experience of becoming in its intertwining with a theory of 
becoming. His own metamorphosis, I argue, is concomitant with a radical “revolu-
tionary” act that transfigures the meaning and the relation to confinement and to 
the world, thereby converting suffering into joy, bodily death into a transcendent 
corporeality, madness into wisdom, and total seclusion into cosmic amplitude – 
a universal being.
Keywords: detention of people; political violence; slow death; survival; Tazmamart 
(Morocco); testimony; torture.
In June 2014, I visited Tazmamart, the infamous Moroccan secret prison. 
Human memories of terror and a few physical vestiges are all that remains: the 
foundations of two razed buildings and 33 graves of the unnamed dead who 
had succumbed to a programmed slow death during 18 years of secret con‑ 
finement. The prison itself is located on the grounds of a large military facility, 
surrounded by hills on all sides, which makes for a naturally enclosed area. 
* Acknowledgment: I would like to thank Abdellah Hammoudi who has read and extensively 
commented on a first version of this text. I extend special thanks to him for the many pertinent 
theoretical and conceptual suggestions, notably those related to Foucault’s ideas. I would like to 
thank Baudouin Dupret for his thoughtful comments, especially his critical suggestions related 
to mysticism and psychiatry. My thanks also go to Roberto Beneduce and Simona Taliani for their 
readings and cinematographic suggestions and for their sound remarks regarding the memories of 
violence and the becoming ‑animal of the human.
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Controlled militarily and insulated geographically, the camp was also 
isolated socially. The inhabitants of the village still have a living memory 
of it: “We did not even have the right to pronounce the word ‘Tazmamart’: 
the name of our village”, one of them told me. “We were living in a contin‑ 
uous fear. We did not know what was in it, we had no right to know, but 
we have imagined the worst, the horrible”. Beyond the village, this imagi‑
nation was exacerbated by a well ‑managed rumor spread throughout the 
country by those in power. True, Tazmamart was a place of secret detention, 
but this secrecy was slyly revealed by the apparatuses of the deep state in 
order to sow terror. Thus, the name of Tazmamart has become the site that 
best embodies the history of political violence in Morocco, the so ‑called 
“Years of Lead” (1956 ‑1999).1
It was during this period that a group of Moroccan soldiers, following 
two aborted coup attempts in 1971 and 1972, were arrested, tortured, 
found guilty, and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 18 months to 20 
years. The convicts were placed in a civil Central Prison to serve out their 
sentences when the unthinkable happened. The prisoners were seized, 
taken in secret by night and transported blindfolded in trucks like “beasts 
of burden”2 to the desert location of Tazmamart. The systems of modern 
governmentality had thus worked to carry out an act of personalized royal 
vengeance.3 The courts performed their function, but the trial was botched. 
The judges followed a certain formalism while nevertheless expressing their 
personal vindictiveness towards the accused, who would ultimately be 
sentenced to prison, ending up at a secret location. Tazmamart was part of 
an overall system combining various regimes of detention and internment 
– including psychiatric internment – and practices of surveillance and 
control. Forced disappearances, torture, assassination, and mass graves 
were part of this form of governmentality. In this setting, the phases of 
the Foucauldian genealogy of sentences, their knowledge and techniques 
were condensed into one another, and especially so the succession of epis‑
temes – the power/knowledge model. But it would be wrong to criticize 
Foucault for something that he did not intend to do, as what is problematic 
is the extension of the genealogy of modernity by some social scientists to 
 
1 On different aspects of this violent past, see Slymovics (2005), El Guabli (2014), Loudiy (2014) 
and Rhani (2018).
2 This is an expression which is often used in the survivors’ testimonies, see, e.g., Marzouki (2000). 
All translations are mine.
3 The execution of some officers involved in one of the coups d’état was conducted without trial 
in the presence of the sovereign and filmed by television cameras. The media thus brought it inside 
homes, erasing any demarcation between private and public.
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the “rest”, thereby rendering invisible the actions and the words of women 
and men from the so ‑called Global South.4
Tazmamart is not an ordinary prison. It is, indeed, a system of secret 
detention that challenges the Foucauldian model, and its rationale is best 
understood outside a universal paradigm of modernity. All rational forms, 
all the proceedings, the choice of place of detention, the organization of the 
cells, the policy of rationing, and the selection of the guards and the Warden 
were motivated by the desire to undo life. This was achieved by dividing the 
prisoners into two groups of 29 each, with individuals assigned to two different 
buildings (Block 1 and Block 2), where they were confined in separate cells. 
The residents of Block 2 were subjected to appalling conditions, suffering 
even more torrid summers and more cold and humid winters, exacerbated 
by its low ‑lying position where rainwater would collect and stagnate, attract‑
ing more insects and causing infections and diseases.5 As a result, in Block 2, 
the mechanisms of degeneration were both more severe and faster. Only 
four inmates survived. The man whose experience I report here is one of 
them. I refer to him by the name “Kawni”, for reasons I shall elucidate later. 
The networks of practices and devices that had regulated the life of both 
Kawni and his comrades in Tazmamart are the kind that take hold of the 
body and transform it. The purpose of this article is to question those proce‑
dures which are not implemented to discipline, to build a habitus or subjec‑
tivity, but rather to undo life. The question that arises, then, is how did the 
inmates redo life, while their lives were decomposing with each passing day?
This energy for survival can be felt in some victims’ testimonies. It emerges, 
individually and collectively, with the very undermining work that has 
4 See, for example, Mitchell (1988), Asad (1993) and Fahmy (1997), to consider only the Arab 
and Islamic parts of this “rest”. For critical analyses of this literature, see Hammoudi (2009) and 
Dupret (2011). Hammoudi demonstrates how Asad emphasizes the disciplinary implications over 
the experiential ‑phenomenological ones, reading anthropological books about ritual and religion 
through the paradigm of the so ‑called coalescence of power/knowledge, thereby subsuming the 
fieldwork encounter under genealogical theory: i.e., models of disciplinary practices found in 
texts that define blueprints. Similarly, according to Dupret, the problem with the extension of the 
Foucauldian genealogy of modernity and its power/knowledge paradigm to Islamic societies is 
twofold: it stems, on the one hand, from its determinist gaze, both retrospective and diachronic, 
on a period of time, a context and a type of production considered in a very broad way; it is relat‑ 
ed, on the other hand, to its non ‑phenomenological account of practices, leaning on documentary 
sources as a platform for historical generalizations. Dupret shows how Mitchell and Fahmy produce 
an evolutionary scheme in the sense that they speak of the process as both corporeal and disciplinary, 
instead of considering it in terms of humanist and progressive reforms. 
5 See the memoirs of some former detainees, e.g., from Block 1: Marzouki (2000), Raïs (2002), 
Hachad in Serhane (2004); from Block 2: Binebine (2009). For a comparative analysis of these 
survivors’ memoirs, see El Guabli (2014) who gives an important insight into their discursive and 
practical strategies of resistance and survival. 
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slowly devastated their lives. It is also active in the dynamics that led a large 
number of them to madness and death. It expresses itself with vital force 
in Kawni’s experience, who, compared to his fellow prisoners, narrates the 
alteration of his body in confounding and unparalleled terms. His survival 
appears as a dilation of theirs, taken to unusual dimensions. In his case, it is 
appropriate to dissect the word and speak of sur ‑vival: in which one element 
seeks to avoid the familiar connotations of a life reduced to its vital functions 
in their most rudimentary state as Kawni’s is a form of life that resists being 
reduced to the “bare life” invoked by Agamben (1998, 2000) and the other 
refers to that which is over and beyond a life secluded and reduced to its 
elementary functions – a meaning that the German über sums up pertinently.
The Deleuzian concept of “becoming” has recently been taken up by 
some anthropologists who provide, however, little insight into the process 
of metamorphosis and even less, it seems, into the conditions under which 
these mutations occur.6 Their ethnographies hardly account for the theory 
of becoming and its lively embodiments. The point here is not to apply a 
ready ‑made theory of becoming to a lived experience of becoming – in other 
words, to subsume the ethnographic experience under a theory of becom‑
ing or its sociopolitical context – but rather to examine their unstable and 
mutually productive articulation.7 In fact, Kawni’s survival experience 
grasps the concept of becoming and transforms it, so that the concept of 
becoming, like Kawni’s becoming, turns out to be an embodied becom‑
ing concept as well. Kawni’s experience, I argue, propels the concept of 
becoming towards the Nietzschean Selbstüberwindung, articulating a will, 
a joyful sacrifice of the self, a bodily metamorphosis, and its dilatation into 
a cosmic ego, kawni, in Arabic.
The Problem of Narrative
“I am 100% victim of an injustice. I was teaching in class when they came 
and arrested us [...]”, says Kawni. He was 24 years old when he was arrested 
6 Biehl and Lock (2010) convey a conception of becoming the processes and conditions of which 
are poorly documented. Holbraad (2012) presents transformation and metamorphosis as being 
grounded in analytic truth. Biehl (2013) speaks of a mutual becoming with his interlocutor, without 
ethnographically demonstrating how it occurs. The author produces in writing a “reality effect” 
or an “effect of the concrete”. For an analytical critic of textual strategies that produce a reality 
effect, see Hammoudi (2009).
7 Borneman and Hammoudi (2009: 16 ‑17; see also Hammoudi and Borneman, 2009: 260 ‑261) 
draw our attention to how this relation between theory and fieldwork experience has now stabi‑ 
lized into a kind of “slavish subservience of the anthropologist to particular philosophical schools”, 
referring to “the tendency of anthropologists to deploy their work only as illustrative cases for 
philosophical trends”, no longer producing ethnographies that challenge philosophers and social 
theorists and their concepts.
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with other colleagues at the military school, following the aborted putsch. 
He was sentenced to three years in prison – a very short period for a presumed 
plotter against an authoritarian king. This “injustice”, he told me, concerned 
him at the beginning, but when he was “thrown into prison”, he realized 
that “ruminating this injustice and its causes is a vicious circle” and that 
“ruminating the past is another sequestration that would sharpen the feeling 
of confinement”. Unjust as his detention may have been, he placidly accepts 
it and transforms its meanings. He holds no anger or resentment: “I have no 
anger, absolutely not […]. The king, even him, I don’t blame him”. It seems 
Kawni immediately realizes what the prison apparatus is engaged in, especially 
upon witnessing the first deaths shortly after his incarceration. His position 
is part of his effort to rid his imprisonment of any traumatic burden and of 
any meaning whatsoever by extracting the “injustice”, “anger”, “resentment”, 
“rumination”... Likewise, it seems the decision to “cut” with the past is part 
of his refusal to testify and to give an account of his 20 years of confinement. 
Many Tazmamart survivors have written their memoirs. Some of them 
publicly testified in various forums and media. They recounted in detail the 
whole history of their ordeal. Yet, Kawni clearly sees no reason for such an 
action: “Testifying? That beats me. I do not know why people do it”, he says.
In 2013, Kawni and I became friends and he agreed to recount his expe‑
riences during informal meetings, without questionnaires or recordings. 
Our encounters began as reciprocal exchanges on a variety of topics and not 
unidirectional interviews about his experience as a prisoner and survivor. 
Wanting to establish a human relationship with the man first, I decided 
from the outset not to establish a (f)rigid position, one of a researcher 
interviewing (or questioning) his interlocutor.8 Kawni is acutely sensitive 
and such an attitude would have probably hurt him, reminding him of an 
interrogation aiming to extract as much information as possible from his 
tragic experience. For this reason, there were no notes or recordings made 
during our discussions, with my subsequent train ride back home enabling 
me to document our discussion, albeit with many ellipses for those gaps 
in my memory and in a discussion that diverged from the main subject. 
In later encounters, I would fill in certain voids. Others, never. From my 
perspective, the purpose is not to fill in theses gaps but rather to take them 
as such, as “lines of flight” that articulate the author ‑interviewee relationship 
and Kawni’s relation to his history and memory.
8 I use this neologism, evocative both of “rigid” and “frigid” (taken in the sense of freezing and 
formality without any gender ‑based sexopolitical meaning) to contest positivist standpoints regard‑ 
ing ethnographic experiences, especially those tackling sensitive issues and involving relationships 
with vulnerable persons.
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Approaching Kawni’s experience is a challenge, given how little he says 
of himself, how long and painful his experience was, and especially the 
force of what he says in a few words.9 His statements are, indeed, rare and 
laconic, some of them aphoristic. His account is not a testimony, nor is it a 
memory stricto sensu. Kawni narrates generic actions – probably condensed10 
throughout his long journey to death – without any narrative composition 
with beginning, middle and end. Without any will to inform about and 
denounce a deadly system, and making it comprehensible.
These narrative fragments, strictly speaking, are not descriptions of lived 
experiences in their happening: there is no indication of dates or space, 
except for the cell where he was confined. Therefore, I consider Kawni’s 
words “freeze ‑frames”, which are not necessarily ordered according to 
chronological sequence and causality and which zoom in on different 
moments of his mutation. This approach, I argue, also allows the elusion 
of certain psychiatric visions that see in Kawni’s position on the past and 
testimony a failure of memory, and specifically a dissociative amnesia fea‑
turing a memory sequestrated in an a ‑social space becoming, therefore, 
rebellious against any form of narrative. When necessary, the narratives of 
other survivors will be recalled to shed light on some aspects of Kawni’s 
peculiar experience as well as on the general context of its unfolding. 
These testimonies intersect his words and actions in many ways: calm, 
silence, discretion, sacrifice, mistreatment of the body, otherness and the 
effort to communicate with the universe.
These “freeze frames” refer, in a way, to the “minor literature” evoked 
by Deleuze and Guattari (1975).11 “Minor” denotes the revolutionary con‑
ditions of any literature within the established and dominant one. Kawni’s 
account is not a fiction. His metamorphosis is not a metaphor, nor is it a 
symbolization.12 It is real and actual, yet its factualness lies at the limits of 
virtual becoming. In his case, I would say, a minor ethnography seems more 
capable of grasping and articulating, in a concrete way, the experience of 
9 Kawni knew from the outset that I was doing research on political violence and that my encounters 
with him were part of this research.
10 I use the word “condensation” for convenience and without projecting Freud’s concept of con‑
densation here. Kawni did not dream of the long life of death he was subjected to. I simply want 
to say that a work of condensation took place, and it formed his words and his images.
11 Three features characterize this literature: 1) it is what a minority undertakes in a major language 
by deterritorializing it; 2) in it, everything is political; 3) in it, everything takes a collective value, 
enunciating another potential community.
12 Neither is that of Gregor Samsa, the hero of Kafka’s Metamorphosis. In his becoming ‑insect, 
there is no resemblance between the two; there is no longer any man or insect, since each deterri‑
torializes the other, in a continuum of reversible intensities (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975).
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the human being in limit situations. Moreover, Kawni’s experience and his 
words serve, to a certain extent, to initiate the process of becoming minor 
for my own anthropology, my becoming the foreigner of my own thought 
– exiled, prisoner, survivor – a becoming that deterritorializes my own 
anthropological perspectives about the revered dualities of confinement/ 
/liberty, unreason/reason, death/life, as well as my own fears and anxieties 
regarding the sociopolitical consequences of my research’s focus on sensi‑
tive topics (i.e. political violence in a context of resilient authoritarianism). 
On the other hand, my conversations with Kawni allowed me to encounter 
the theorists with whom I dialogue in this text, so that our relationship 
takes on a collective value. That is to say, a “collective arrangement of 
enunciation” which, in return, enables communication with Kawni’s own 
enunciation and experience in order to follow it. Thus, despite its apparent 
apolitical stance, everything in Kawni’s experimentation, and how I myself 
embody it, is eminently political: radically political and revolutionary, 
in the sense that it lays down the meaning and the relationship of/to the 
political differently.
Incarceration as Burial: A Program of Slow Death
“When they buried me in Tazmamart […]”. Tazmamart, Kawni undoubtedly 
realizes immediately, is not an ordinary prison, nor is it even a place of 
detention. Having been secretly taken in the dead of night, Kawni, like the 
others, is technically no longer a prisoner. He, like the others, disappears 
without a trace. He, like the others, realizes that he is destined to slowly die 
in confinement. Binebine (2009: 42), one of Kawni’s comrades in Block 2, 
expresses the same feeling of being buried: “I had not yet come to terms 
with the fact that I was in front of what would now be the tomb of my life: 
cell number thirteen”.13 Of the cell where he is “buried”, Kawni gives a 
condensed glimpse: an “iron door”; a “slab made of concrete which serves 
as a bed”; “a hole that serves as a toilet”; “two very dirty and worn blankets” 
and “darkness and solitude”. The sensation of burial is further amplified by 
the general conditions of incarceration: insufficient food; “bowls of water 
where some starches float”; atrocious cold; suffocating heat; foul odors; 
bugs that swarm; illness; madness and death. For 18 years, Kawni, like the 
others, has to die from exhaustion, hunger, cold, heat and disease. Without 
rest, cramped, always bent over and rarely breathing fresh air.
13 Hachad evokes the same feeling: “From that day on, we were no longer committed officers and 
NCOs [non‑commissioned officers] condemned by a military court for two failed coups against 
King Hassan II. We had become the walled off Tazmamart, each one reduced to the number of 
his cell.” (in Serhane, 2004: 47).
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“It was extremely cold in the winter”, says Kawni. “Every year at least one 
inmate died of cold and disease [...]”. Indeed, early on, death struck in Block 
2: less than one year after the abduction, two inmates died. Binebine (2009: 
67 ‑72) gives a moving testimony of one of them.14 Until his last breath, fellow 
inmate Chemsi never admitted what was happening to him, “his presence 
in this tomb”. He “lost his mind” and ceased to cover and feed himself.
He spent long hours sitting on the ground in the cold and solitude of his madness, 
near, he believed, to his poor mother, whom he saw very close in the darkness of his 
purgatory. When the guards arrived, they found the food scattered on the ground and 
him, naked, without cover in the freezing cold of the winter. Benumbed, his limbs 
frozen, he could not readily go to the door to fetch his food. The guards refused to 
carry it to him; the food remained there until the next meal. Then they threw the 
unopened pot, unwashed, which was filled again and placed near the door. Finding 
his death at breakfast, the guards did not show up later in the morning. At noon, 
when they brought the meal, they brought a stretcher and took him out.
His death makes the inmates of Block 2 aware of the gravity of the situ‑
ation. They realize that they are condemned to die in the darkness of their 
cells, with no help and no resources other than their own ability to endure 
time. With time, month after month, death becomes a “familiar visitor”.15 
Hachad (in Serhane, 2004: 68) intensely describes this gradual inculcation 
of a “programmed death”. As the days go on, the convicts have understood 
that “destiny” (i.e., the king) has chosen an end completely different from 
imprisonment for them:
A death that goes beyond death, since each prisoner has to die several times during his 
lifetime before disappearing forever, in horrible suffering, abominable, indescribable, 
but above all inhuman agonies. A death beyond all ordinary death [...]. The death 
chosen for us is a special death, which goes beyond the boundaries of the imagin‑
able, beyond the limits of the human. Every moment has to be a moment of death. 
We should die slowly and at any moment, as slowly as possible. … and go ever farther 
into the unspeakable things that are not said, but lived in the flesh. (ibidem)
14 The other victim was Mohamed Kinat, who, like Kawni and Chemsi, was sentenced to three 
years. He died as a result of food poisoning (Binebine, 2009).
15 Every year or so at least one inmate died. 1977 and 1979 were particularly macabre, as several 
detainees succumbed (Marzouki, 2000; Binebine, 2009).
Survival and Metamorphosis in a Moroccan Secret Prison | 191
With this kind of incarceration, it is hard to speak of biopolitics, if not 
to consider as such the politics that manages life in order to undo it.16 
In this kind of politics, it seems the formation of the ego does not have any 
relevance; it remains, anyway, inaccessible. Several features distinguish the 
regime of Tazmamart from the model provided by Foucault (1975) and, 
as mentioned earlier, its rationale should be grasped elsewhere than in a 
universal paradigm of modernity. The convicts are locked in a building 
without possible escape; the guards throw in water and morsels of food and 
immediately close the cells. The panopticon does not imply the visibility of all 
the angles, but rather the absolute invisibility of the prisoners. The inmates 
become transparent without being observed. Concurringly, all rational 
forms, all the proceedings, the choice of place of detention, the organiza‑
tion of the cells, the rationing, the selection of the guards and the director, 
are animated by the will to undo life. The population of Tazmamart is subject 
to a program of slow and unavoidable death, administered by a program of 
weakening, based on the proliferation of pathologies. The inmates either 
die or transmute to survive.17
Ascetic Desire
The energy of this transmutation can be grasped, in its radical expression, 
in Kawni’s experience. “When they buried me in Tazmamart, I realized that 
the real Tazmamart was the life I was leading outside. [...] I found a sense 
of freedom”. Kawni reverses the respective values of life outside prison and 
life (i.e., burial) in prison. As a result, another life opens for him, life accord‑ 
ing to a dimension other than the common alternatives: justice/injustice; 
freedom/detention; life outside/life ‑death in confinement.
Accordingly, Kawni takes some radical decisions towards his comrades:
It was extremely cold in the winter. Every year at least one inmate died of cold and 
disease; moreover, every time, fights break out to get his blanket and clothes [...]. 
16 It is, rather, a case of a “thanatopolitics” or, to use Mbembé’s word (2003), a “necropolitics” 
whose purpose and devices are deployed not to manage life, but to kill individuals and groups.
17 Incarceration with this objective is well known, as in the camps of the communist regime in 
Cambodia, the Soviet gulags, and the Nazi extermination camps. The accounts of survival to these 
programmed deaths constitute an immense literature. The purpose is not to discuss it to understand 
survival and what makes it possible, but rather, to analyze the unusual experience of an inmate 
who has survived, by a singular effort, a confinement designed to cause his slow death. Frankl 
(1984 [1959]), as former prisoner of the camps and as psychotherapist, embodies both in his lived 
experience and his thought how the human being, confined in tragic conditions – suffering from 
hunger, cold and brutality, humiliation, fear, daily expectation of extermination – can survive, 
rendering suffering and even dying tolerable and meaningful. This capacity to “say yes to life” 
in spite of tragedy, as we shall see, echoes Kawni’s words and experience. 
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The prisoners were acting as if they were outside, like ordinary people in an ordinary 
society: frivolities, selfishness and conflict. 
Meditating on the reactions of his comrades, Kawni decides “to withdraw 
and isolate” himself, sharing “with them only some difficult moments”. 
His cell becomes a khalwa. This word is telling. It refers to a cave where 
the ascetic retires to seek reflection and privation. In his khalwa, Kawni 
experiences “the test of meditation and detachment” and fights “suffering 
and misfortune”. He then breaks off with the fellow inmates and befriends 
their deadly enemies, those who make them so vulnerable:
Then I said to myself, why this fear of the cold? Why not reconcile myself to it? 
I know; the body has its limits. Instead, I decided not to see in the cold an enemy, 
but a good friend. I took off my clothes. I only kept on shorts. The others thought 
that I had gone crazy. I did not defend myself. I did not answer them [...]. Only a 
madman, they said, could confound the friend and the enemy.
Despite the warnings of his comrades and their derision, Kawni 
undresses and embraces the fatal cold of Tazmamart. According to him, 
the “body can transcend the limits of tolerance by departing from fear”. 
The true enemy is not the cold, but the fear of the cold. It is not disease, 
but the fear of disease. It is not even death, but the fear of death. After his 
withdrawal, Kawni shares only some difficult moments with the others: 
“If someone falls ill or if someone dies [...]. If someone falls ill, I take care 
of him during his illness [...]. If anyone dies, it is me who washes him, 
wraps him in a sheet and buries him”.18 The others, he says, are afraid: 
“They fear illness and death”.
Not only does Kawni isolate himself from the life of his comrades, but 
he also cuts himself off from his own history: “When you cut off with 
society [...] when you cut off with your history [...] you enjoy real happi‑
ness, you become free. It is a revolution”. He also states, in an aphoristic 
manner: “And what is a revolution, if not the act of cutting off with the 
past to free oneself from its burden and regain happiness?”. Kawni has 
certainly experienced the happiness he evokes. We have evidence of this. 
Sidqi Abderrahman, a survivor of Block 1, told me: “when [Kawni] was 
transferred to our Block, he woke up early in the mornings and began to 
18 Kawni most likely refers here to a later period of incarceration, probably in the 1980s, 
when the guards began to allow some prisoners to leave their cells to help their sick comrades 
and to bury the dead.
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let out youyous, like a woman [...]. He sang the songs of women. Powerful 
voice”.19 Marzouki (2000: 219) captured one of these moments too: 
The very next morning we were awakened by a huge beating Tam ‑Tam on the door 
of a cell, accompanied by strident youyous... A real festive atmosphere! It was [Kawni] 
who, in the depths of his new cell at the end of the corridor, continued a practice 
to which he had become accustomed in the other building.
The powerful voice and the strength of the noise may well surprise us, 
given Kawni’s advanced physical disability, of which we have many testi‑
monies (Marzouki, 2000; Raïss, 2002). Where does this force, this female 
voice, this energy, this joy come from? Kawni posits history as the burden 
that reinforces the feeling of confinement and, therefore, hinders one’s 
becoming free. He thereby subverts the very meaning of incarceration and 
its raison d’être. The prison is not a place or a space, but a temporality. 
It is a history that chains up the possibility of becoming: becoming joyful in 
darkness, becoming free in tight confinement, becoming a woman, becoming 
timeless. “I reconciled myself with disease and death. Death is the continu‑
ity of life. Death before life [...]. Never dies whoever accedes to the ʿishq”.
The word ʿishq has a very strong mystical connotation. It refers to the 
superfluous flow of love that overwhelms the ʿāshiq’s body and soul to 
extend beyond, to the whole existence.20 ʿIshq is Desire. Yet it is not a 
desire for someone or something. It is an ascetic and joyful desire that sto‑ 
ically accepts incarceration, suffering and death. Beyond all carceral powers 
that undo life, Kawni makes of himself, of his body, a desire which is not 
reduced to a subject (and an organism) over which these powers can be 
exerted. He desires to make of his condition, of his body, of himself, a new 
mode of existence: another life. Thus, the question is not how Kawni can 
resist power (political and carceral) which controls everything, but rather 
how power can control his desire, which flees everywhere as “lines of flight” 
and as “movements of deterritorialization” (Deleuze, 2003 [1990], 2006a).21 
Kawni’s experience is indeed a movement, a becoming that goes beyond 
19 Interview, January 17, 2016. Youyous are vocal sounds North African women let out to express 
emotion and joy at some ceremonies, such as weddings.
20 See in particular Ibn ‘Arabi (2002 [1240]), the 13th century mystic and philosopher. No doubt 
there are many points of comparison between Kawni’s account and the mystics’ experiences and 
narratives, including those of hermits. Nonetheless, it is not necessary to take account of them in 
order to grasp Kawni’s singular experience and its theoretical scope. What is important, in my 
view, is to study in the future how his experience relates, in vivo, the mystical idiom and practice 
with the philosophical literature.
21 See also Seigworth (2011).
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the framework of a determining history and politics. His act of breaking 
with the past is revolutionary, yet it is neither a militant action nor a form 
of resistance against a regime of confinement or against a power or force of 
domination. Not only has he never used the words in question, but he has 
also never expressed any feelings of confrontation, injustice, resentment, or 
anger. Instead, in his experience, revolution articulates a process of folding 
in which the force is exerted on itself – the force to cut off with the past, 
with the inmates’ society and with his own incarcerated ‑body. Thus, without 
falling into a reactive role of friction or blockage, which could reproduce 
power relationships, Kawni’s revolutionary becoming allows him to evade 
both carceral control and political power.
According to Deleuze (2003 [1990]), the concept of the “fold” implies a 
process of “subjectivation” when the force is put in a relation to itself and not 
in a relation to another force, to give the means to survive what would oth‑
erwise be unbearable.22 As in Kawni’s experience, this process of “folding” 
is carried by a desire that emerges from a joyful ascetic movement (Deleuze 
and Parnet, 1996).23 It is a will to power which is also a will to die, always 
seeking to disorganize and to free itself from instincts and habits in order 
to experience new modes of perception and action. New possibilities of 
existence. The relation Deleuze establishes between the “fold” and “desire” 
powerfully echoes the experience of Kawni and his words. Yet the theory 
does not account for singular and concrete experiences of folding when the 
subject is really and strictly confronted with death and madness, and the 
lively creativity that moves forms of life seems to be absent, appearing only 
as the arrangement of desire in lack (capitalist scarcity, transfers of desire 
and fantasy). For this reason, I prefer to consider the “fold” as a floating line, 
toward which individual and collective creations and creativities are oriented 
in limit ‑experiences. Kawni seems to have acted in this way, according to 
a floating line between confinement/liberty, unreason/reason and death/ 
/survival, along which his selves are redefined, including the final one: his 
second ‑body, which emerges amidst the ruins of the old one, the first ‑body.
The Awakening of the Other Body
Kawni speaks: “If we remain at the level of the first ‑body, we feel an atro‑
cious pain, caused by the cold, hunger, lack of sleep, fear, isolation and 
darkness”. “If we reach the second body, we can no longer feel suffering”. 
22 The concept of the fold echoes the Foucauldian process of “subjectivation”, which does not 
imply a return to the subject but rather the constitution of new modes of existence.
23 On the Deleuzian concept of desire, see also Holland (2011).
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“The first ‑body is a prison for the second ‑body”. The body of Kawni, the 
individual who is condemned, imprisoned and then buried in Tazmamart, 
is the location of pain and sorrow. It is itself a prison that confines the possi‑
bility of becoming, becoming another body able to overturn the conditions 
of confinement. This becoming second ‑body is concomitant with the ascetic 
effort carried by Kawni’s will and desire to isolate himself and to reconcile 
himself to the enemies of the body (cold, disease and biological death). 
In Kawni’s words, “the cell was an ideal place for the emergence of the 
second ‑body: total obscurity, without a mirror, without contact with the out‑
side world”. For Kawni, darkness and solitude are the occasion for a retreat 
to “dialogue with” his second ‑body, which is “gradually awakened […]”. 
This awakening is a willingly active operation. “To allow the second ‑body to 
unfold and impose itself”, Kawni “must go through trials and combat, must 
engage in a struggle to weaken the first ‑body: starving it, exposing it to the 
cold and keeping it awake”. The second ‑body, in turn, carries this work of 
destruction further; he continues: “the second ‑body, while unfolding and 
prevailing can get rid of the first ‑body and throw it away”.
Kawni pushes the conditions of his incarceration to the extreme to ruin 
his body (his prison), to empty it of its mortifying meanings. From its ruins 
emerges another body, molting, and which progressively sheds the carapace 
that enveloped it and breaks free. “When you discover the second ‑body 
you escape imprisonment”, says Kawni. The inmate’s words and actions, 
as mentioned earlier, refer to a process of folding when the force is exerted 
on itself (ruin, cut off, revolution), internalizing suffering and decomposition 
with more abundance and desire, and articulating an inner and intimate 
sense. The second ‑body subverts, or “deterritorializes”, its bodily organiza‑
tion, the carceral organization, and the latter’s ultimate end: death. It thus 
embodies a new possibility of life that unfolds beyond Tazmamart’s walls 
and iron bars, beyond the control of inhuman persecutors, and beyond the 
deadly system of an authoritarian power.24
Kawni’s second ‑body refers to a “body ‑without ‑organs” (BwO). 
According to Deleuze (2006b [1964]: 218), the BwO emerges when 
the body is deprived of any voluntary and organized use of its faculties. 
Flows occur, invade this body, energize affects and produce another body, 
but as an intensive outline roused by the waves that provoke its involuntary 
use. The philosopher gives the example of the spider and its movements, 
24 The second ‑body is biological, but also and inextricably political, for it subverts both the 
organism’s organization and power’s organization (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980). In other words, 
unlike the Foucauldian biopower, more concerned with the systems of reterritorializing the body, 
the second ‑body, like the body‑without‑organs, is the very agent of deterritorialization.
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the insect receiving only the slightest vibration that travels across its body 
as an intensive wave, causing it to leap into action. The image of intensive 
outline is powerfully evocative. Involuntary action, commanded by “the 
other” (i.e., Kawni’s other) or in consultation with him is comparable to 
these waves. However, the model of the spider falls short in Kawni’s case. 
Elsewhere, Deleuze and Guattari (1980: 190) assert that the BwO under‑
lies the organism and its development: a full “intense egg” with absolute 
contiguity of two sensations without resemblance, but in vicinity; like a 
zone of blurriness, of indiscernibility, established between two terms, as if 
they had reached the moment immediately preceding their respective dif‑
ferentiation. One thinks here of what Deleuze (1993) says of Captain Ahab, 
in pursuit of Moby Dick, the white whale, fleeing into the vicinity where he 
can no longer be distinguished from the cetacean, both beings becoming 
human ‑animal. Certainly this is a becoming non ‑human of the human, yet 
the philosopher does not elaborate on this dual identity, subsuming it under 
a universal energetic machinism.
Kawni says of his second ‑body that it is a “little animal”.25 Kawni’s becoming 
second ‑body is thus a becoming animal. A becoming non ‑human that echoes 
his interaction with nature; his detachment from history; his detachment from 
sociality (and at the same time his commitment to his sick and dying compan‑ 
ions); his insensitivity to the cold, to the heat, to hunger, to humiliation, to 
suffering; his refined sensitivity and his ascetic desire. Twisted like the folded 
line of force, the second ‑body articulates a micro ‑politics of flight animated 
by an overwhelming desire. Becoming a little animal is thus a mechanism 
(a device) for digging a den, then a hole in the walls of the prison (and 
beneath) to escape and vanish into nature. Becoming second ‑body “is access 
to El ‑Kawn”, says Kawni. The Kawn designates Nature, the Cosmos and the 
Universal. Binebine (2009: 160) also mentions that Kawni was communicating 
with “Nature” from his cell and trying to join the “universal being” – as if his 
body, becoming second ‑body (a small animal) met Nature in their interlacing, 
both beings becoming (Merleau ‑Ponty, 1964).
Kawni’s words somewhat recall what Kafka (1996 [1915]) writes of the 
becoming “little ‑monster” of Samsa. His becoming a bug, while twist‑ 
ing and degrading his body, seems to bring out in him all his greatness 
and subtle nature: his kindness, his sensitivity, his utter unselfishness, 
25 Marzouki (2000: 218) describes Kawni as a “bent over body” with a carapace of filth that walks 
like an animal: “The third to appear was [Kawni]. Folded on himself, his chest was at a right angle 
with his legs and his very long hair and beard were hanging so that they could have swept the floor! 
Dressed in shorts […], he walked barefoot and his completely disjointed gait made him curiously 
look like a dinosaur”.
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his constant preoccupation with the needs of others, his imaginative and 
spiritual altitude (Nabokov, 1980). Deleuze and Guattari (1975: 63 ‑76) 
describe an evocative signification of the becoming animal in Kafka’s novels. 
These becomings, they write, represent an exit (not freedom), a living line 
of flight (not an attack): an intensive journey even on the spot or in the cage. 
The animal proposes to the human a means of escape the latter would have 
never thought of alone. A creative line of flight, which is, however, sub‑ 
sumed under the machinic arrangements – posited as the project and design 
of becoming animal. Kawni’s becoming a small animal shows an exit and 
draws a floating line he is actually able to move across. Thus, contrary to 
the universal machinery embodied in fictional sociopolitical arrangements, 
his own becoming is carried out in the second ‑body itself as an isolate 
revolutionary body, a small animal upraised against the established power 
and its gigantic, mortifying machinery. 
The Self and Its Double: A Call for Otherness
Kawni’s dual bodily identity is reminiscent of a willing and deliberate pro‑
cess of folding, or of becoming a small animal, which provides the means 
to survive what would otherwise be unbearable: when life confronts some‑
thing akin to death and thought faces something akin to madness (Deleuze, 
2003 [1990]). Kawni speaks of the encounter between his two bodies as a 
moment of “almost madness”. He says: “darkness and solitude were the 
occasion for a retreat to dialogue with my second ‑body, who was gradually 
awakened; I almost went mad”. He almost goes mad, just as he almost 
died. The “almost” is significant. Yet, Kawni’s experience is considered 
by some psychologists and psychiatrists an instance of dissociation. That is, 
an originary subject that a post ‑traumatic disjunction has divided. In fact, 
a psychologist who was in charge of Tazmamart survivors after their release 
states that Kawni has experienced a form of “madness” similar to those many 
prisoners who died in a state of delirium following the direct and brutal 
contact with death – their comrades’ death and their own impending and 
inescapable death.26 According to Dr. El Hamdaoui, the double sentence, 
and especially among innocent victims, like Kawni, reinforced the death 
panic. A plunge into darkness and an inhibition of the life impulse ensue, as 
the victims participate in their own destruction: “death row syndrome”. Two 
subsequent processes can be distinguished: sequestration of the memory 
in a virtual existence, as an effective reaction for survival, and intrusive 
involuntary memory, featuring fixation on ideas, rumination, and the 
26 Interview with Dr. El Hamdaoui, in January 2014.
198 | Zakaria Rhani
inability to forget. The psychologist finally states that there were more 
people subject to the second process in Block 2 as compared to Block 1, 
where the prisoners had apparently better organized themselves.27 However, 
the psychiatrist Ziou Ziou considers Kawni’s experience an “illusionary” 
reaction to “create another model of the body that enhances resistance or 
displaces symptoms”.28 In other words, this is an “imaginary body”; a more 
nuanced position, yet it suggests another form of dissociation: that which 
exists between the real and the imaginary (or illusory).
After having noted certain psychological and psychiatric comments on 
Kawni’s case, my particular aim now is to stress the friction of perspectives 
between the person who experiences and narrates an uncommon experi‑
ence and the clinician who interprets it according to a pre ‑established 
framework. The purpose here is no longer to argue for the veracity and 
validity of one perspective or another. Dissociation, or dissociative amnesia, 
is not necessarily a false description, but it is a psychiatric perspective on an 
“external subjectivity” whose own perspective and how he/she articulates 
it should be seriously considered, otherwise, some dimensions of this lived 
and embodied experience will be totally incomprehensible. Moreover, 
it is not because an experience is uncommon that it must be explicable by 
the same structuring narrative: i.e. psychiatric diagnosis. Like the common 
experiences, which are multiple, the uncommon and peculiar experiences 
are equally as multiple, as they may elude the medical generalization – which 
is also a cultural reductionism. Many psychiatric classifications, including 
dissociative disorders, are constructs, debated and often based on historical, 
cultural and sociological specificities which are difficult to systematically 
apply on and extend to various and differed contexts.29 In other words, 
contrary to some psychiatric interpretations which consider the uncommon 
experiences as evident signs of unreason, precluding any exploration of 
the content of dissonant voices and subsequently shrinking the potential 
27 In fact, over time, the inmates of Block 1, unlike those in Block 2, also managed to make con‑
tact with the outside world, receiving more help from their relatives in the form of money, food, 
fortifiers, medications and news, particularly the news regarding the international pressure on the 
kingdom to disclose the fate of the disappeared, which increased their hope of a possible liberation 
(Marzouki, 2000; Raïss, 2002; Serhane, 2004). Marzouki (2000), Raïss (2002), and Binebine (2009) 
reported many experiences of “illusions”, “deliria”, “hallucinations”, “paranoia”, “rumination”, 
“amnesia”, and “spirit possession”.
28 Interview with the psychiatrist Abdellah Ziou Ziou, who also was in charge of Tazmamart’s 
survivors after their liberation.
29 According to Hacking (1995: 143), this cultural generalization somehow features a psychiatric 
imperialism: “Instead of seeing Western dissociative disorders as a local and specific form of 
trance”, psychiatric classification “suggest that trance is a subtype of Western illness, dissociative 
disorders. Worse, they turn central and meaningful parts of other civilizations into pathologies.”
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complexity of human experience, this uncommonness is quite experienced 
by individuals, and even by their communities, as a sign of an embodied 
wisdom: supernatural aptitude, interaction with nature, intense sensitivity 
and self ‑giving (Hacking, 1995; Leudar and Thomas, 2000).30
The fact is that Kawni, with his second ‑body, does what other detainees 
could not do with their “delusions” and “verbal hallucinations”, “dissocia‑
tion”, “rumination”, “deliria”, “amnesia” and “spirit possession” (Marzouki, 
2000; Raïss, 2002; Binebine, 2009). His words and experience show no 
panic of death, no inhibition of the life impulse. It is quite the opposite: 
“The second ‑body is a vital impetus, a vital energy [...]”, says Kawni. It is 
true that he has himself undertaken the destruction of his body, his first‑
‑body. It is thus an active and positive destruction, carried by desire, joy, 
energy and wisdom, thereby stripping confinement, and power more gener‑
ally, of its deadly significations, while creating a new universe of reference. 
Marzouki (2000) does not speak of delirium when refering to Kawni. 
Binebine’s book, Tazmamort, a text of great literary and human quality, 
which Kawni once told me he particularly appreciates, does not mention 
any scene of this kind. Binebine, who is without a doubt the most atten‑
tive and sensitive witness to his fellow inmate’s experience, does not try to 
circumnavigate Kawni and his “other”:
Taciturn, he spent his time praying, practicing yoga, or “communicating with nature”, 
as he said. He was fond of culture, he listened with passion to the novels I told, 
followed attentively my courses of philosophy (at the reasonable level which is mine) 
and especially theology lessons. [Kawni] listened attentively, filtered what interested 
him and avoided any challenge. He was the first to put yoga on the set. We did not 
know much about it, but everyone contributed. Apart from yoga, he also distinguished 
himself by his detachment from the world, inspired by Hindu stories […]. He often 
mistreated his body to better control it. […]. In a superior act of detachment, [Kawni] 
decides to give us the radio. Such an act was inconceivable at Tazmamart, especially 
in our building. (Binebine, 2009: 160)
According to Binebine (ibidem: 156 ‑159), Kawni had a gold ring which 
had gone undetected. A guard noticed the ring on one occasion when talking 
30 Leudar and Thomas (2000) have comprehensively analyzed Socrates’s case (see also their 
refreshing analysis of Schreber’s case). In their view, unlike psychiatry, which retrospectively 
interprets Socrates’s ability to “hear voices” and “verbal hallucinations” as the signs of unreason, 
his contemporaries considered them as the sign of a supernatural experience. The philosopher was 
granted this privilege for he had the force to resist mundane passions – which makes the soul more 
perceptive – and higher intelligence guiding a gifted soul. 
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to him, standing near his cell. The guards generally talked with the most 
discreet convicts: “One of those was [Kawni]”. The conversation between 
the two shows that Kawni was in full possession of his faculties. He managed 
to convince this guard that if the ring had miraculously escaped detection, 
it was because God had intended it for the guard himself. Kawni offered 
him the ring, without asking for recompense yet the latter insisted on giving 
something in return, and Kawni suggested a little radio, which he indeed 
received. However, the guard was spotted, and fearing denunciation by 
another guard, returned to search for the radio. He went into the wrong 
cell, found nothing, and inflicted a severe punishment on its occupant, 
a fact that hastened this man’s death. After this event, [Kawni], who was 
incredibly sensitive, refused to keep the offending radio. He gave it away, 
as he had given away his ring, his clothes, his blankets, his time to heal the 
sick and to bury the dead, his body, his first ‑body, in a gentle and radical 
act of renunciation and detachment from this world, the world of confine‑
ment and decomposition.
Another witness, Raïss (2002: 323 ‑324), narrates a contact with Kawni, 
when the latter was moved from Block 2 to Block 1:
The case of [Kawni] was very strange. He refused to shave his beard and cut his 
long, grimy hair, and insisted on keeping his shirt and khaki shorts even in winter. 
He loved to walk barefoot to feel the pain, and to practice “YOGA”. He did it self‑
lessly. […] I asked him:
 – Listen [Kawni], you’re friendly, extremely polite and very educated, but what I do 
not like is your carelessness. Look, all your comrades are wearing pants, jackets and 
sandals. So shave your beard, and cut your hair. He answered me with downcast eyes 
and with an air full of regret:
– You’re right Raïss, but unfortunately the other refused.
Another comrade explained to me that he was referring to the “jnoun” who lived 
with him in the same cell, who ordered him to stay as he is, so they could bequeath 
to him the wisdom of the Buddhists. 
Both accounts testify that Kawni’s life in confinement articulates hybrid 
wisdom, arising from different influences. Kawni, it seems, carried out his 
metamorphosis with inculcated and inherited knowledge and practices: 
i.e., tradition. Those who are familiar with Islamic culture will easily rec‑
ognize Sufi vocabulary in some of his words (i.e. khalwa, ʿishq, ruin of the 
body). Can we still speak of a cultural idiom? Yes, but only if we take into 
consideration both Kawni’s cultural ecumenism and his own inventions 
and concede that something akin to cultural mutation is occurring with 
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the image of his bodily metamorphosis. It is important here to state what 
Kawni spoke of his relationship to religion. First, the Sufism he refers to is 
not “that of appearances and institutions”. Secondly, according to him d n 
(the religion at large) is “a universal system” or a “universal detachment”, 
beyond the “confessional boundaries”. Religion thus refers to a universal 
undetermined by a specific confession or affiliation. In contrast, tadayyun, 
religiosity, is the “ethnic”, or cultural, expression of this universal – “habits” 
and “conditioning”, such as “bodily manifestations” – that is to say, habitus 
and disciplines.
Kawni, like many others, experienced some forms of piety in Tazmamart: 
learning and reciting the Quran, prayers, including the prayers of death, 
and theology lessons. In addition, he also became instructed in the ways of 
Hinduism and even Buddhism, and he practiced yoga. His experience and 
words embody an idiom embedded in Islamic tradition but – this is hardly 
surprising – very open to other wisdoms, including philosophy.31 This is, 
without a doubt, a call to cultural and existential otherness, which some 
detainees could only understand in terms of contact with familiar spirits 
(jnoun or jinn). Yet, this local interpretation itself draws from other sources, 
as it is the jinn who taught Kawni Buddhism.
Regarding Kawni’s metamorphosis, psychiatric knowledge and common 
cultural knowledge suggest a heteronomy, or a self that is becoming of 
another nature alien to himself. In fact, this is not the case since Kawni com‑
municates and interacts with nature itself. Kawni’s subjectivity, as mentioned 
earlier, reveals itself in disjunctions and always on a floating line. There is no 
dissociation (or dissociative amnesia), nor is there a spirit possession. Rather, 
Kawni’s dual subjectivity is a becoming that transmutes the very meanings 
of traumatic prison conditions.32 Kawni’s experience suggests a leap into 
the unknown, a mutation of the body and the soul through the transforma‑
tion of the body, a technique of the self that eludes the instillation of death 
by carceral techniques, articulating a “will to power” that joyfully receives 
suffering and death. His metamorphosis embodies a surpassing of the self 
and its condition, a self ‑surpassing which spreads to a universal dimension.
31 Notions such as “discursive tradition”, “disciplines” and “economy of pleasure” do not account 
for these phenomena. On these notions, see, e.g., Asad (1993, 2009).
32 In his case, we can rather speak of “schizoanalysis” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980), which refers 
to the identification of the trajectory of the symptoms to see if they can serve as indicators of new 
universes of references capable of acquiring a consistency sufficient for turning a situation upside 
down. See also Smith (2011).
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Becoming Universal
“Access to the second ‑body is access to the universal (El ‑Kawn)”, says Kawni. 
Binebine (2009: 160), in the passage quoted before, mentions how his fel‑
low inmate was “communicating with nature”. He also wrote that Kawni 
“made numerous attempts to communicate from his cell with what he called 
El ‑Kawn, literally ‘everything that exists’ and in my opinion ‘the universal 
being’”. The author rightly writes that his fellow inmate joins the universal 
being. Kawni’s metamorphosis is thus an impulse that propels him to a 
universal dimension. That is to say, the second ‑body is a body that expands 
to the dimensions of a cosmic ego. To what does this cosmic ego refer? 
How can one reach the universal from total isolation?
Remember that Kawni acts his suffering out in a positive way. The self‑
‑destruction of his first ‑body and the emergence of the second ‑body refer 
to both a will and a struggle, not only against his physical body but also 
against the hold of nostalgia and resentment. Hence, Kawni evades the 
condition of a subject – of a corporeal, historical, social and even cultural 
belonging – on which the vagaries of a power, and a political determina‑
tion more specifically, could be exercised, thereby overturning the prison 
machinery and its ultimate ends: madness and death.33
Kawni’s experience, and what he said about it, intersects significantly 
with the Nietzschean Selbstüberwindung and the cosmic propensity it 
implies. The Selbstüberwindung is both a struggle and a bodily metamor‑
phosis, for the body is the immediate and concrete illustration of the self‑
‑overcoming and hence the witness of becoming. Therefore, the body asserts 
itself as a dynamic subjectivity which, while transcending itself, interprets 
the surrounding world and composes other possibilities of life. From this 
perspective, the spirit is only the culmination of the process by which the 
body overcomes itself to become an another ‑body, as a self which expands 
to the dimensions of a cosmic ego, articulating the richness of the personal‑
ity: an inner profusion, eagerness, instinctive pleasure, great sacrifice, self‑
‑sacrifice, and great love (Nietzsche, 2015 [1886], 1968 [1901]; Garnier, 
1966, 2004 [1982]). 
Just as in Kawni’s experience, self ‑destruction in situations of suffering 
and vulnerability – which must be distinguished from the act of turning 
33 The story of the prisoner Darrell Standing, narrated by Jack London (1987 [1915]), is very 
interesting to compare with Kawni’s experience, especially regarding the method by which 
the former achieved “death in life”, to become a “temporary master of time and space”, to vault 
“the prison walls to rove among the stars”, thereby disclosing “the ultimate secret of the uni‑
verse”. The comparison between the two experiments certainly deserves a more in ‑depth critical 
analysis. It is the subject of an in progress separate study.
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against oneself – does not denote an instinct of survival, or a mere will ‑to ‑live. 
It is affirmation, not negation. Creation, not preservation. Joy, not resentment 
or revenge. Liberation, not nostalgia. In other words, the profound meaning 
of the tragic is coextensive with the Selbstüberwindung. It cannot be reduced 
to a “medical formula” or to a “moral solution” to suffering (Deleuze, 2014: 
26). Rather, it expresses a will to power, a joyful and voluptuous principle 
of consumption and absolute anxiety that disturbs existence and prevents 
it from closing in on itself; tirelessly opening up creative possibilities for the 
becoming ‑other, other possibilities of life (Nietzsche, 2015 [1886], 2006 
[1883 ‑1891]; Garnier, 1966). 
To be able to connect with such an underground reality inhabited by 
suffering and decomposition, Nietzsche certainly faced the painful line 
that separates reason from madness and life from death. However, the 
philosopher does not describe the subsequent processes and mechanisms 
of self ‑destruction and bodily metamorphosis. And where the philosopher 
foresees an Übermensch, a superhuman (or over ‑human) confined in rivalry 
and confrontation with the divine and its avatars – transcendence, religion, 
asceticism – Kawni experiences himself as a small animal who, moved by an 
ascetic desire, becomes, and while becoming, transfigures the very mean‑
ing of the relation to the divine, to the world, and to the human condition. 
Besides, while the superhuman remains imprisoned in his greatness and in 
the madness of greatness, the little animal suggests an exit and a flight to 
vanish into nature, into the cosmos. The revolution, which is concomitant 
with Kawni’s metamorphosis, designates a process of turning a situation 
upside down: power into desire, suffering into joy, imprisonment into a 
vital impulse, corporeal death into a transcendent corporeality, madness 
into wisdom, cultural belonging into universal amplitude. A universal 
being – Kawni.
Edited by Scott M. Culp and Daniel Lourenço
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Os dois corpos do recluso:  
sobrevivência e metamorfose  
numa prisão secreta marroquina
Tazmamart não é uma prisão comum. É um 
sistema de detenção secreta que desafia o 
modelo foucaultiano e a lógica que lhe está 
subjacente é melhor compreendida fora 
de um paradigma universal da moderni‑
dade. Todas as formas racionais, todos 
os procedimentos, a escolha do local de 
detenção, a organização das celas e a polí‑
tica de racionamento são conduzidas pela 
vontade de desfazer a vida. Os reclusos ou 
morrem ou transmutam para sobreviver. 
Este artigo relata a experiência de um 
dos sobreviventes que, em comparação 
com seus companheiros de prisão, narra 
a sua metamorfose corporal em termos 
Les deux corps du détenu:  
survie et métamorphose dans une 
prison secrète marocaine
Tazmamart n’est pas une prison ordinaire. 
Il s’agit d’un système de détention secrète 
qui défie le modèle de Foucault et la logique 
qui lui est sous ‑jacente est mieux comprise 
en dehors d’un paradigme universel de la 
modernité. Toutes les formes rationnelles, 
tous les procédés, le choix du lieu de 
détention, l’organisation des cellules et la 
politique de rationnement sont dictés par 
la volonté de défaire la vie. Les détenus 
meurent ou transmutent pour survivre. Cet 
article rapporte l’expérience de l’un des 
survivants qui, en comparaison à ses compa‑
gnons de détention, décrit sa métamorphose 
corporelle en termes confondants et sans 
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desconcertantes e sem paralelo, com o 
objetivo de apreender a sua experiência do 
devir na sua própria interligação com uma 
teoria do devir. A sua própria metamor‑
fose, argumento, é concomitante a um ato 
radical “revolucionário”, que transfigura 
o significado e a relação com o confina‑
mento e com o mundo, convertendo assim 
o sofrimento em alegria, a morte corporal 
em corporalidade transcendente, a lou‑
cura em sabedoria e o isolamento total 
em amplitude cósmica – um ser universal.
Palavras ‑chave: detenção de pessoas; 
morte lenta; sobrevivência; Tazmamart 
(Marrocos); testemunho; tortura; violência 
política.
parallèle, dans le but de saisir son expérience 
de devenir dans son propre entrelacement 
avec une théorie de devenir. Je soutiens 
que sa propre métamorphose est concomi‑
tante à un acte radical “révolutionnaire”, 
qui transfigure la signification et le rapport 
au confinement et au monde, convertissant 
ainsi la souffrance en joie, la mort corporelle 
en une corporalité transcendante, la folie 
en sagesse et l’isolement total en amplitude 
cosmique – un être universel.
Mots ‑clés: détention de personnes; mort 
lente; survie; Tazmamart (Maroc); témoi‑
gnage; torture; violence politique.

